

CONFIDENTIAL

Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP80M01082A000800110005-1

DDI-1933-74

25 June 1974

25X1

NOTE FOR:

SUBJECT : Perspectives for Intelligence 1975-1980

1. This note is in response to your request for comments on the subject paper now being circulated to USIB and IRAC members for their views.

2. This draft differs little from the previous one which was circulated among Agency components on 4 June.

3. Part III on Implications for Intelligence Planning contains two new points (page 19):

- . greater reliance on other nations for intelligence contributions;
- . better utilization of intelligence in support of other government elements, Congress, the public and allied governments.

Actions on page 20 call for reviews and examinations of possible means of implementing these points.

4. In general, this is a good paper and provides a ~~more~~ meaningful basis for getting a few things underway. To do so, however, it will be necessary to assign responsibilities to specific intelligence entities for the various "Actions" in the paper. Otherwise, the paper will go down the same road as other USIB-approved documents (like the old PNIOs and NIE Post Mortems) which exhort "everybody to do something" but charges no one specifically with getting the job done.

Herbert J. Jenne
Chief

Collection Guidance and Assessments Staff

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP80M01082A000800110005-1

CONFIDENTIAL

Additional DDI Comments--

OCI - no changes

OSR - stands on its earlier
statements

25X1



28 June 1974
(DATE)

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP80M01082A000800110005-1

MEMORANDUM FOR: O/DDI:

OER Comments on Perspectives for
Intelligence, 1975-80

Our principal comments on an earlier draft of the paper were on Paragraphs II-5 and II-7. II-7 has been revised, and we now find it acceptable. II-5 has not been changed, and we would much prefer our proposed draft (attached). We also suggest rewording of a sentence in I-3, China, as marked in the text.

25X

MAURICE C. ERNST
Director
Economic Research

24 Jun 74
(DATE)

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101
AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP80M01082A000800110005-1

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP80M01082A000800110005-1

Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP80M01082A000800110005-1

~~SECRET~~
-5-

3. China. Almost certainly, China will undergo a change in leadership. The succession could see an initial collegial unity followed by an authoritarian, aggressive and xenophobic leader. The initial period could also be followed by fragmentation into a variety of contesting military, party, and provincial elements. For planning purposes, however, it would seem most appropriate to assume that the follow-on leadership in China will maintain the unity and authoritarian discipline imposed by the Communist Party, that it will be primarily concerned with internal unity and meeting the social and economic problems within China, and that it will retain a somewhat paranoid attitude toward the outside world and particular suspicion of countries on its periphery.

China will continue gradually to develop its strategic forces and will present a retaliatory threat to the Soviet Union. By 1980, it will have the capability of threatening the United States with a demonstration (or desperation) strike by a small number of ICBMs and SLBMs. China will maintain large general purpose forces capable of operations on its periphery but will be unlikely to commit them in the absence of major provocation or concern.

ILLEGIB

~~SECRET~~